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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: Religious Freedoms or Free Exercise
City of Boerne v. Flores, No. 95-2074, 1997 WL 345322 (U.S. June 25,
1997).
Due to a growing congregation, the St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne,
Texas wished to expand its small church. However, under a local zoning
ordinance, the building was declared a historical site, and the city refused to
grant the permit.1 The Archbishop of the church challenged the denial as,
inter alia, a burden on the free exercise of religion in violation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).2 The district court held that by
enacting RFRA Congress had overreached the scope of its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The Fifth Circuit reversed this
holding,4 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.5
The issue before the Court did not center on religious freedoms or free
exercise; rather, the issue centered on power. Justice Kennedy, citing Marbury
v. Madison and the Federalist Papers, framed the issue as whether Congress
had overstepped its bounds in passing RFRA.6 Did Congress go beyond its
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting a nonremedial,
definitional law which sought to legislate constitutional principles of religious
freedom? To this question, the court answered yes
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA, reversing the
Fifth Circuit. In doing so, the Court upheld the precedent of Oregon v.
Smith.' In Smith, the Court held that laws of general applicability may be
applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling
governmental interestC RFRA was enacted as a direct response to this
controversial holding in an attempt to do legislatively what the Court refused
to do judicially; make exceptions for religious practices in laws of general
1. City of Boeme v. Flores, No. 95-2704, 1997 WL 345322, at *3 (June 25, 1997).
2. Id. (citing Religions Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000.bb (1994)).
3. Id. at *3. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is known as the
"enforcement clause." This clause grants Congress the power to pass laws which enforce the
Due Process and Equal Protection rights of citizens. Id. at *6-7.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *6.
7. Id. at *16.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *4.
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applicability." RFRA required courts to use the compelling interest test and
the lea;t restrictive means test when examining cases claiming substantial
burdens on religious exercise." The Supreme Court, however, found this to
be a serious congressional violation of the separation of powers and, therefore,
unconstitutional."2
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, characterized RFRA as a
"considerable congressional intrusion" into the police power of the states, as
well as an intrusion on judicial authority. Kennedy further stated: "Broad
as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance."'4 In other words, Congress
has trezd on judicial turf, and the Court will not allow it.
In arriving at this decision, the Court determined that RFRA went beyond
Congress' enforcement power." Congress may only pass laws which deter
or remady constitutional violations as part of its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power.6 The Court found this power to be remedial only and
not an affirmative source of power for Congress to legislate judicial
wrongs. 7 In short, Congress may not interpret the Constitution, and as
explained by Justice Kennedy, "Congress does not enforce a Constitutional
right by changing what the right is. It has been given power 'to enforce,' not
the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."'8
The Court stated that RFRA was not a permissible, remedial measure
because its means were out of proportion to its ends. 9 The usage of strict
scrutiny and a heavy evidentiary burden on the state is unreasonable in light
of the relatively rare occasions of deliberate religious persecution." The
Court differentiated this religious claim from the civil rights claims of the
sixties in that there is no widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this
country.2' However, because African-Americans were subject to pervasive,
widespread laws of discrimination, Congress was given more latitude to
remedy the situation.' RFRA, however, remedies no such history of
religious discrimination in this country.'
10. Id. at *5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *16.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ia at *7.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 300 (1988)).
18. Id. at *8.
19. id. at *14.







In this case, the Supreme Court asserted its judicial review to strike down
an Act of Congress. In doing so, the Court reasserted its holding in Smith that
laws of general applicability apply to all citizens regardless of an incidental
burden on Free Exercise. Congress' attempt to reinsert strict scrutiny in such
cases was rejected. Indeed, RFRA will no longer protect religious claims,
such as the Archbishop's claim for relief. Also, many religious claims of
Native American importance, such as prisoners' rights to practice religion, hair
length in schools and prisons, peyote use, and bald eagle feather protection,
will no longer be able to seek the protection of RFRA to avoid local laws of
general applicability. Many cases, especially in the area of eagle feather
possession, have been recently decided using RFRA as law. These cases are
now subject to the lesser standards of the Smith case.
Dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor, who also dissented in Smith, argued that this case was
wrongly decided because the Court had misinterpreted the Free Exercise
clause of the First Amendment O'Connor cited many examples to illustrate
that throughout history religious freedom has prevailed over legislative acts
burdening religion.' Free Exercise, in O'Connor's view requires
accommodation, whenever possible, to guarantee the right to participate in
religious activities.' As such, O'Connor argued that religion is to be
respected and not merely tolerated when it does not conflict with a generally
applicable law!" Justice O'Connor concluded by maintaining "that it is
essential for the Court to reconsider its holding in Smith... in this very case"
and would "direct the parties to brief this issue and set the case for
[re]argument. '
Mike Carr
LAND RIGHTS: Quiet Title Action Against the State
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, No. 94-1474, 1997 WL 338603 (U.S.
June 23, 1997).
The Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho (the Tribe) alleged ownership of the
submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various related navigable
tributaries lying within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation (the
submerged lands)." The Tribe brought suit in federal court against the State
of Idaho (the State), several state agencies and various state officials in their
24. l at *21.
25. Id. at *25.
26. Id. at *32.
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, No. 94-1474, 1997 WL 338603, at *1 (June
23, 1997).
No. 1]
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individual capacities, seeking exclusive rights of occupancy, use and quiet
enjoyment of the submerged lands and nullification of all Idaho statutes
relating to their regulation and use.' In addition, the Tribe sought to enjoin
the defendants from taking any actions in violation of its ownership interests
in the submerged lands.' The State moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint
based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court granted the
State's motion and declared that Idaho was in rightful possession of the
submerged lands? On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the claims against the State and its agencies but reversed with
regard to the claims against the individual state officials.33 The Court of
Appeals found the doctrine of Ex parte Young applicable to the declaratory
and injunctive claims against the state officials insofar as the claims sought
to preclude continuing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership
rights.'
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's finding of
the applicability of Young. The majority held that granting the Tribe's
requested relief against the individual officials would abrogate the sovereign
interests of the State, thus the Tribe could not avail itself of the Young
exception.' The Eleventh Amendment immunity privilege, therefore, allowed
the State to insist upon answering the Tribe's claims in its own courts and the
case was remanded.'
Regarding immunity, the Court concluded that the Tribe maintained the
same status as other foreign sovereigns against whom the State enjoys the
Eleventh Amendment immunity privilege" Accordingly, the Tribe's suit is
barred from federal court unless it falls within the exception recognized by the
Court in Ex parte Young.38 The Ex parte Young exception allows certain
suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials in their
individual capacities to be brought in federal court, despite the Eleventh
Amendment's immunity provision. The Court cautioned that the exception
cannot be applied in every case which requests such relief' because a suit






35. Id. at *18.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *6.
38. Id.
39. Id.




implicate state interests.4' Therefore, a careful balancing and accommodation
of state interests must accompany any potential Young application.!2
While the Tribe's request for prospective relief from ongoing violations of
federal law would ordinarily be sufficient to invoke the Young exception, the
Court found the Tribe's suit to be the functional equivalent of a quiet title
action against the State.43 Such an action would shift virtually all benefits of
ownership of the submerged lands from the State to the Tribe and infringe
upon Idaho's sovereign authority over a vast reach of land and water within
its territorial boundaries." The Court found this situation to preclude the
availability of the Young exception.45
In concluding that the submerged lands are within the State's sovereign
domain, the Court relied upon both statutory and case law. One case cited by
the Court designated lands underlying navigable waterways as "sovereign
lands" while another bestowed upon the States the "absolute right to all
their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use."'
The Court also recognized an Idaho statute which declares the natural waters
and waterways within the State to be State property' as well as specific
statutory provisions relating to State rights to both the waters4 ' and the
shores5' of Lake Coeur d'Alene.
The Tribe, on the other hand, claimed beneficial interest in the submerged
lands based on Lake Coeur d'Alene's inclusion within the original boundaries
of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation and unextinguished aboriginal title.5' The
Court took only cursory notice of the Tribe's interests, however, before
declaring the disputed lands to be within the sovereign province of the State
and refusing to apply the Young doctrine to the Tribe's claims.' The case
was then remanded to a State forum.'
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join,
concurring in part and concurring in the opinion.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed that the Tribe's suit was the
functional equivalent of a quiet title action which sought to take the
41. Id. at *6.




46. Id. at *15 (citing Utah Div. of States Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-198
(1987)).
47. Id (citing Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)).
48. Id. at *18 (citing Idaho Code § 42-101 (1990)).
49. Id. (citing Idaho Code § 67-4304 (1989)).
50. Id. (citing Idaho Code § 67-4305 (Supp. 1996)).
51. Id. at *3 (citing Executive Order of November 8, 1873, reprinted in I CHARLES J.
KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 837 (1904)).
52. Id. at *18.
53. Id.
No. 1]
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submerged lands completely out of the State's sovereign jurisdiction.'
O'Connor rejected the Tribe's ownership claim and agreed that the relief
sought would effectively vest title in the Tribe.55 Since the Tribe cannot
maintain an action in federal court which seeks to divest the State of a
property interest, O'Connor concurred with the majority's finding that-the issue
should be excluded from federal jurisdiction. 6
O'Connor did find fault, however, with the majority's central conclusion
that a case-by-case balancing approach is appropriate for determining the
application of the Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional
limitation.' Finding this analytical method too vague, O'Connor suggested
that a straightforward inquiry into ongoing federal law violations and a proper
request for prospective relief would be a better approach for determining the
applicability of Young.58 Despite her disapproval of the plurality's mode of
analysis, O'Connor nonetheless found that the Young exception could not be
extended to the Tribe's case."
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer join, dissenting;
In his dissent, Justice Souter contended that the Tribe's suit falls squarely
within the Young doctrine and that the Federal District Court was obligated
to hear the case.' Souter argued that Young applies because the Tribe
satisfied the two conditions necessary for maintaining a federal court action
against individual state officials.6' First, the officials are operating in
violation of federal law.' Both the Tribe and the State claim ownership of
the submerged lands based on federally granted rights and the parties agreed
that the lands are governed by federal law.' The officials, therefore, by
applying Idaho state laws, were engaging in ultra vires activities contrary to
federal law.'
Second, Young requires a request for prospective, not retrospective,
relief.' The Tribe requested future injunctive measures but did not seek
damages for past infringement on tribal interests.' Even if a victory by the
Tribe would have an incidental economic effect on the State, Souter urges that
54. Id. at *19.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 (1982)).
57. Id. at *22.
58. ld. at *24.
59. lid.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *25.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *26.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *25 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 644 (1974)).




the cessation of illegal actions by the State officials should be the paramount
concern.
67
Souter concluded that ongoing violations and prospective relief, if
successfully proven by the Tribe, would constitute .'precisely the type of
continuing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned under
Young"'" Thus, nothing in the majority's opinion justified the preclusion of
a federal forum for the Tribe's claim against the State officials.'
Kathleen Smith
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
POWER TO TAX: Tribal government taxation power in its territory.
State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996)
The State of Alaska, Yukon Flats School District, and Nesser Construction
appealed the outcome of a remanded hearing of the suit against the Native
Village of Venetie (Venetie I)." Venetie attempted through the Tribal court
system to collect a business tax on Nesser Construction.7' However, the State
of Alaska, who was responsible for payment of the tax, filed suit in Federal
Court to enjoin Venetie from collecting the tax.'
Venetie I: The Native Village of Venetie (Venetie) consists primarily of
descendants of the Neets'aii Gwich'in, a group of Native Alaskans.73 In 1940,
the Neets'aii Gwich'in adopted a constitution providing for Venetie to be the
governing authority for a 1.8 million acre reserve.74 Subsequent to the 1971
enactment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), Congress
conveyed title to the Venetie Reservation.75 The Native Village of Venetie,
current title holder of the Venetie Reservation lands, passed a 1986 Business
Activities Tax.7' This five percent tax authorized Venetie to collect on gains
arising from commercial activity within the village."
The Nesser Construction Company (Nesser) contracted with the State of
Alaska through the Yukon Flats School District to build a school within the
67. Id
68. Id. at *29 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 282 (1986)).
69. Id at *35.




74. Id at 1289 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 476).
75. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 476).
76. Id. at 1290.
77. Id.
No. 1]
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boundaries of Venetie. Venetie assessed the five percent tax or $166,203
against Nesser.' When Venetie filed suit in tribal court to collect the
assessed taxes, the state, being the party responsible for paying the tax,
refused to defend in tribal court.' Instead, the state filed suit in Federal
Court claiming that the Tribe lacked jurisdiction to impose a tax and enjoining
the Tribe from further enforcement." In State of Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie, the court held that in order to impose the tax on nonmembers,
Venetie must be a federally recognized tribe and it must inhabit Indian
country.' However, on remand, the district court formulated a four-part
inquiry determining that Venetie is a tribe but does not inhabit Indian country
pursuant to the transfer of title under ANCSA.
Venetie II: The issues on appeal include (1) whether the district court
formulated and applied too restrictive a standard in determining that Venetie
does not inhabit Indian country; (2) whether ANCSA extinguished Indian
country in Alaska; and (3) whether Venetie continues to occupy Indian
country and therefore retains authority to assess a tax within its boundaries.'
Indian Country. The Court reviewed Congress' definition of Indian country
summarized as (a) lands within an Indian Reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities, and (c) all Indian allotments.' The Court determined
that, although Venetie could not be classified as a reservation nor as an
allotment, precedent existed to classify Venetie as a dependent Indian
community.' The Court explained that a tribe may hold fee simple title to
land and that holding title does not "preclude a finding that the land was 'set
aside' by the government.""n Further, the Court indicated that federal
superintendence should be liberally construed,. Thus, the unchallenged state
jurisdiction and noncontinuous federal supervision will not eliminate Indian
country.' These two general factors were used to identify Venetie as a
dependent Indian community.'
The Court determined that the two general factors - the land must be set
aside for the use of Indians and the Native inhabitants must be under federal





82. d. (citing 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1291 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1296-1300.
90. Id.




required that on remand the lower court apply the six part analysis it
suggested in Venetie L' The six part analysis supports the broad
interpretation of the two general factors: "(1) the nature of the area; (2) the
relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal
government; (3) the established practice of government agencies toward that
area; (4) the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the
degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the
area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian
peoples.'93
ANCSA and Indian Country in Alaska. The Court explained that the land
set aside under ANCSA included lands for Alaska Natives.' The village
corporation established under ANCSA qualifies as Native Alaskan because
only Natives were allowed to own and manage the village corporations for
twenty years from the enactment of ANCSA.95 The Court demonstrated that
monetary distributions to business entities differ significantly from land grants
to village corporations because of the Natives' historical ties to the land they
inhabit." Further, the Court maintained that the village corporation restricted
to Native ownership was conferred by Congress and thus satisfies the set
aside requirement.'
With regard to federal superintendence, Native village corporations are
subject to federal controls where a privately owned corporation is not." The
articles of incorporation and bylaws must be approved by the federal
government, and may not be amended without the approval of the Secretary
of Interior." The Court explained that although ANCSA fosters Native self-
determination and autonomy, it in no way interferes with the unique
relationship that Native Americans share with the federal government."'
Indeed, the Court claimed that ANSCA was "a unique and innovative attempt
to meet" the special responsibility it has toward Native American citizens and
"marks a genuine endeavor to facilitate Native self-determination by providing
for the direct involvement of Alaska Natives in the management of their
affairs."
10
Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991); United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649; United States v.
McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914)).
92. Id. at 1292.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1297.
95. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1)).
96. Id. at 1295.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1298 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1606(e)).
99. d (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1606 (h)(1)(B)).
100. Id. at 1302.
101. Id
No. 1]
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The Court held that ANCSA did not eliminate Indian country in Alaska
and that it may still exist."2 Further, the application of the six-factor
analysis indicated that Venetie met the set aside and superintendence
requirements." Therefore, the Court concluded that Venetie is a dependent
Indian community and that its territory qualifies as Indian country."1° The
lower courtes judgment was reversed and remanded."u
Cindy Hill
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: Breach by the State of Utah
Pelt v. State of Utah, 104 F.3d 1534 (10th Cir. 1996)
In a class action, Jack C. Pelt (Pelt) and the Navajo Nation, Intervenor,
sued the State of Utah for breach of its fiduciary duty." Under The Act to
Permanently Set Aside Certain Lands in Utah as an Addition to the Navajo
Reservation (the Act), Congress directed that 37-1/2% of any net oil and gas
royalties, accruing from the Aneth Extension paid to the State of Utah, should
be utilized for the benefit of Indians residing therein."' The Aneth
Extension, a strip of land added to the Navajo Reservation, has a distinct
history predicated on the divergence of the Navajo Tribe." 8 One group of
Navajos settled on a reservation (Western Navajo Indian Reservation) and
another fled north into areas of Utah such as the Aneth Extension."'
However, the beneficiary class was expanded in 1968 to include all Navajo
residents of San Juan County, Utah."'
The controversy arises from the diverse positions of the Plaintiffs, the
Navajo Tribe, and the administration of the San Juan County Navajo royalty
fund by the State of Utah. The two issues before the Appellate Court include
(1) whether Plaintiffs, the Tribe, or both have a cause of action for breach of





106. Pelt v. State of Utah, 104 F.3d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 1538 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1933, ch. 160, 47 Stat. 1418, 1418-19, as
amended by, Act of May 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-306, 82 Stat. 121, 121).
108. Id.
109. Id.




vindicated by the cause."' A secondary issue arises in determining whether
the Tribe may bring a cause of action instead of the United States."'
Individual Plaintiffs. The State, arguing that the Plaintiffs have no right of
action under the Act, used Cort v. Ash to support its argument."' In Cort,
the Supreme Court formulated a four-part test in determining whether a party
has an implied right of action."" In applying the test, a Court must
determine "(1) whether the statute creates a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) whether there is any legislative intent, either explicit or implicit,
favoring the creation or the denial of the right; (3) whether the right is
consistent with the legislative scheme and its underlying purposes; and (4)
whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the states, so it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law.."
The Court applied the first inquiry of the Cort test to the case at bar and
found that the Act and the subsequent amendment were for Plaintiffs'
benefit."6 Utilizing previous decisions,"' the Court found that the fund was
not intended for the Navajo Tribe as a whole."' Even after Congress
enlarged the beneficiary class in the amended provision, Congress did not
curtail the rights of current beneficiaries under the Act."' Therefore,
explained the Court, the Aneth Navajos are one of the primary beneficiaries
under the Act." ° The Court held that the Plaintiffs are one of the class or
beneficiaries for whose benefit the Act was intended. 2'
The Court, combining the second and third Cort inquiries, found that
Congress intended the fund to operate in a manner comparable to a common
law trust."z The framework of the Act closely follows the common-law trust
structure and the definition of a Trust as defined by the Second Restatement
of Trusts." Therefore, the Court determined that if the Act resembled a
trust and was intended to act as a trust, then the beneficiaries of the trust
would have a cause of action against the Trustee (the State) in the event of
111. Id. at 1540.
112. Id. (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1362).
113. Id. at 1541.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1541-42 (citing State of Utah v. Babbit, 53 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 1995);
Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Comm'n, 198 F. Supp. 218 (D. Utah 1961); Sakezzie v. Utah
State Indian Affairs Comm'n, 215 F. Supp. 12 (D. Utah 1963)).
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a breach."2 ' The Court held in favor of Plaintiffs under the second and third
Cort inquiries."z
Finally, under the fourth inquiry of Cort, the Court indicated that the issue
at bar falls under the realm of the federal courts, pointing out that the care of
Native Americans is a uniquely federal question." The Court held that
Congress intended to create a discretionary trust for the benefit of the San
Juan Navajos with the State of Utah as trustee using the 37 1/2% royalties as
the corpus. 7
The Tribe. The Tribe offered two arguments in support of its argument that
the Tribe could stand in place of the United States. First, the royalties flow
through the Tribe, and thus, the Tribe has standing to sue the State for breach
of its fiduciary duty.'" Second, the Tribe may stand in place of the United
States to litigate a case.' The Court disagreed stating that the royalties
were created for the benefit of the Aneth resident Indians and not for the
Navajo Reservation." The fact that the beneficiaries' of the Act were
Navajos does not vest a right in the Tribe.'3' Therefore, the Court held that
the Tribe cannot step into the shoes of the United States, and the district
court's dismissal of the Tribe's complaint was proper.'
The Court reversed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Tribe's complaint.' Reversed
in part, affirmed in part, and remanded."
Cindy Hill
VALID OSAGE CONSTITUTION: Federal Courts and Tribal Constitutions
Fletcher v. United States, No. 95-52078, 1997 WL 309902 (10th Cir. 1997)
In March 1990, Plaintiffs, WilliamS. Fletcher and three others of Osage
descent, sued on behalf of all unallotted Osage descendants.' They
challenged the validity of the 1881 Osage Constitution, and the restriction on
the unallotted descendants' right to vote in tribal elections, (including holding
124. Id. at 1543.




129. Id. at 1545. The Tribe cited 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994) to support their contention,
Id.
130. Id.








tribal office), and right to receive a share of tribal income." The allotted
Osage and descendants consist of those Osage Indians whose names appeared
on the 1908 membership roll.37 Only the allotted tribal members are
allowed to vote, hold office, and receive tribal income.' Tribal income
derives from a trust fund whose corpus consists of the Osage mineral estate
and proceeds from the sale of Osage lands in Kansas.'39
In a previously decided case, the court upheld the Osage Tribal Council's
governing powers." However, the issues of validity of restriction of the
franchise to headright or allotted owners and the validity of the 1881
Constitution remained open to litigation."" These issues were raised by
Plaintiffs before the district court. Subsequently, in August, 1990, Tribal
Defendants 42 moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
invoking Tribal sovereign immunity.43
For more than five years, the district court ignored Defendants' motions to
dismiss in the face of its overzealous protection of a perceived voting rights
issue.'" Instead, the district court established a commission and charged it
with revising the 1881 Osage Constitution.4 ' Subsequent to a court ordered
referendum, the revised Constitution was voted on and approved by a majority
of a greatly expanded Osage electorate." Finally, in September, 1995, the
district court's final order "declared moot Tribal Defendants' motion to dismiss
on the ground of sovereign immunity."'47
Tribal Defendants argued that under the constitutional mootness doctrine
this case was not moot.'48 The Court agreed with Tribal Defendants'
argument stating that the sovereign immunity issue was insufficiently handled
by the district court. 4" Further, the interests of the Tribal Defendants prior
to the referendum were overlooked." The Court stated that the district court
abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of prudential mootness."
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Act of June 28, 1906, 45 Stat. 539).
138. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-963, at 8 (1972)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at *2 (citing Logan v. Andrus, 640 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1981)).
141. Id. (citing Logan, 640 F.2d at 270).
142. Tribal Defendants consist of Osage Tribal Council and each individual member
thereof; Charles Tillman, Jr., as Principal Chief of the Osage Tribe and Individually; Edward
Red Eagle, Sr., as Assistant Principal Chief of the Osage Tribe and Individually.










Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Thus, the Court held that the case is not moot because these issues represent
live controversies.' 52
Plaintiffs and Federal Defendants"3 argued that the case should be
dismissed based on mootness because Tribal Defendants did not seek an
interlocutory appeal. " The Court stated that, while it is arguable that Tribal
Defendants could have sought such an appeal, there is no question that they
asserted the sovereign immunity defense at every critical stage of the
proceeding. '" Further, the Court explained that dismissing the appeal as
moot on grounds of equity would undermine the rule that waiver of sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed. Thus, the Court held that
under the equity rationale," the case at bar cannot properly be considered
moot.
The Court also dismissed arguments by Plaintiffs and Federal Defendants
that Tribal Defendants lacked standing to appeal due to harm resulting from
the district court's final order.' The Court noted that the referendum
process ordered by the district court which resulted in the 1994 Constitution,
if left intact, would displace the Osage Tribal Council as the general
government of the Osage Tribe."' Therefore, the Court determined that the
Tribal Defendants have standing to appeal."w
Because the Osage Tribe itself is not named as a Tribal Defendant, the
Court reviewed the question of when a party can assert sovereign
immunity.'' Tribal immunity like state and federal immunity are all treated
the same; claims against the sovereign protects all officials of the sovereign
in their official capacity." The Court reasoned that because Plaintiffs sued
the members of the Osage Tribal Council, who had been acting in their
official capacity, the Tribe's sovereign immunity protects these officials.'"
The Court held that "Tribal Defendants properly and adequately challenged
federal jurisdiction on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal
Defendants did not unequivocally waive the Tribe's immunity by failing to
152. Id.
153. Federal Defendants consist of United States of America; Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of
Interior; Ada E. Deer, Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs; Gordon Jackson,
Superintendent of the Osage Indian Agency.
154. Fletcher, 1997 WL 309902, at *4 (citing 28 US.C. § 1292 (a)(1)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing In re Chareaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322 (2nd Cir. 1993)).
158. Id. at *5.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997)).






seek interlocutory review."'" Finally, immunity from suit deprived the
district court of jurisdiction."
Tribal Defendants argued that only Congress can limit or expand a tribe's
power of self-government.'" The Tribal Defendants further argued that the
referendum and the 1994 Constitution are invalid when viewed in light of the
1906 Act.67 The Court stated that Congress prescribed the form of tribal
government for the Osage tribe.'" Under Congress' authorization, the Osage
Tribe and its Council are imbued with general governmental authority to
resolve questions surrounding the affairs of the Osage Tribe.'" The 1994
Constitution created a new general government predicated upon separation of
power similar to that of the United States of America.' Congress, under the
1906 Act, had already mandated the structure of the tribal government, such
as the method of selecting a principal chief and tribal council.'7' Therefore,
the government created by the 1994 Constitution is inconsistent with the 1906
Act and is invalid.'
The Court held that "[o]nly Congress has the power to permit a
fundamental alteration of the prescribed form of tribal government. The
results of the district court proceedings and the 1994 referendum are reversed.
The right to vote in elections of the Osage Tribe is restricted to headright
owners, and the form of government established by the 1994 Constitution is
declared invalid."''
Cindy Hill
164. Id. at *8.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *9.
167. Id.




172. Id. at *11.
173. Id. at *15.
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